Banking crises: the impact of financial liberalization by Ferreira, Gustavo de Jesus da Eira
A Work Project, presented as part of the requirements for the Award of a Masters
Degree in Finance from the NOVA – School of Business and Economics.
Banking Crises: the Impact of Financial Liberalization
Gustavo de Jesus da Eira Ferreira
Student Number 717
A Project carried out under the supervision of:
Professor Paulo Manuel Marques Rodrigues
January 2014
2
Banking Crises: The Impact of Financial Liberalization
Abstract
This paper intends to study whether financial liberalization tends to increase the
likelihood  of  systemic  banking  crises.  I  used  a  sample  of  79  countries  with  data
spanning from 1973 to 2005 to run a panel probit model. I found that, if anything,
financial liberalization as measured across seven different dimensions tends to decrease
the probability of occurrence of a systemic banking crisis. I went further and did several
robustness tests – used a conditional probit model, tested for different durations of
liberalization impact and reduced the sample by considering only the first crisis event
for each country. Main results still verified, proving the results’ robustness.
Keywords: financial liberalization, banking crises, panel data probit model.
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1. Introduction
In the last years, following the financial crisis of 2008, several voices raised against
financial liberalization. Major concerns were that the deregulating measures initiated
throughout the world economies several decades before were the main cause of this
monumental systemic banking crisis. Fingers were pointed at government leaders and
regulators were blamed and deemed irresponsible. This paper wants to challenge the
general knowledge regarding this topic and answer the question: does financial
liberalization increase the likelihood of a systemic banking crisis? Previous studies are
contradictory and not comparable due to differences in sample, liberalization measures
and crisis definition. Building on a previous study from Shehzad and Haan (2008) I am
using a panel data probit to model the impact of financial liberalization in 79 countries
for the period spanning from 1973 until 2005. This study adds value by extending the
number of countries considered and therefore increasing the number of observations and
estimation accuracy. Also, I am using the most recent databases on financial
liberalization and crisis occurrence. Another difference regarding this paper is that I
used different control variables which choice was backed on stronger theoretical
grounds. Besides, the robustness tests conducted herein differ from those used by
Shehzad and Haan (2008).
I found that, in fact, financial liberalization as measured by the seven dimensions: credit
controls and reserve requirements, interest rate controls, entry barriers, state ownership,
policies on securities markets, banking regulations, and restrictions on the capital
account tends to reduce the likelihood of a systemic banking crisis. Results are robust to
changes in sample related to the crisis occurrence variable and the model used (panel
probit vs conditional logit models).
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The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 is the literature review containing the
major studies on this topic; Section 3 does a theoretical framing on banking crisis and
financial regulation; Section 4 explains the data used to perform the analysis; Section 5
explains the model and estimation method; Section 6 presents the empirical findings on
the topic being studied; Section 7 intends to test the robustness of the results and
Section 8 concludes.
2. Literature Review
The first study of this kind dates from 1998, a paper by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache
(1998b) in which the authors argued that financial liberalization actually increases the
likelihood of a banking crisis.  For their  study they looked at  a sample of 53 countries
(both developed and developing countries) for the period from 1980 to 1995. Great
criticism is tied to the narrow proxy for measuring liberalization they used. They
ignored the majority of the dimensions embodied in the financial liberalization
phenomenon and looked only at interest rate liberalization. Even though, another
interesting conclusion was drawn: financial liberalization tends to have a less negative
impact in economies where the institutional environment is strong.
Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) focused on twin crises and found that banking crises
tend to precede currency crisis and both are more prone to happen in the aftermath of
financial liberalization. In their study, they considered as indicators of financial
liberalization the ratio of M2 over reserves, the ratio of domestic credit to nominal GDP
and real interest rates among others. They further argued that financial liberalization
shocks, in the sense that they provide eased access to financing, seem to be related with
boom-bust cycles.
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Also using a panel-probit model, Noy (2004) showed that financial liberalization can
pose a threat to the banking sector in different ways. In the medium run, in fact, the risk
taking behavior it promotes can have negative effects on banking stability. However, he
also shows that the major problem is associated with the loss of monopoly power
brought by this kind of liberalization in the short run. Fragility of results can be argued
from the fact that it measures financial liberalization using very few dimensions of this
phenomenon.
Tornell, Westermann and Martinez (2004) analyzed the link between financial
liberalization, growth and crises in the developing world.  For this,  they took a slightly
different approach by looking at the impacts on the tradables and non-tradables sectors
of the economy. They reached the conclusion that crises are the price to pay to have
growth in the presence of weak enforceability environments. Due to weaker financial
controls and increased credit availability, financial fragility may lead to occasional
crises. In fact, financial liberalization brings growth in a not so smooth way and needs
therefore to be followed by judicial reforms and contract enforceability. In general,
tradables sector tends to recover faster from a crisis comparing to the non-tradables
sector.
Ranciere, Tornell and Westermann (2006) found that the benefits of financial
liberalization in spurring growth outweigh the bad economic impact caused by the
financial crises it facilitates. They look at the so called twin crises – the occurrence of
both  a  banking  crisis  and  a  currency  crisis  –  given  that  these  are  more  common  in
financially liberalized economies. By using an empirical model which combines a
growth model and a crisis model, they allow for the financial liberalization to have a
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double impact: a direct effect on fostering growth and an indirect cost associated with a
higher tendency for financial crises.
More recently, taking advantage of a more complex and accurate database on financial
liberalization, Shehzad and Haan (2008) changed the paradigm that financial
liberalization increased the likelihood of banking crises. In their study, they split
systemic and non-systemic banking crises and found that liberalization may actually
have different impacts, depending on the type of banking crisis. Regarding systemic
banking  crises,  financial  liberalization  does  not  seem  to  impact  positively  on  the
likelihood of its occurrence. On the other hand, when dealing with non-systemic
banking crises, liberalization may play an important role.
3. Theory
a. Banking system and crises
Banking crises have hit the financial system in a repetitive way over the last decades.
Their increased severity and comprehensiveness has created many problems that range
from the lack of credit to the economy to the malfunctioning of the payments system.
All in all, banking crises tend to jeopardise economic growth through the reduction of
investment and consumption, forcing many viable firms into bankruptcy. On a greater
scale, confidence in the whole financial system can be deeply harmed, leading to the
close of hugely important banks.
With the role of funds allocators, banks shift money from the economic agents that are
net lenders to those that assume a role of net borrowers.  As such, banks are given the
difficult task of turning short-term deposits into long-term loans making money on the
spread between the rates charged and the ones they offer. During this activity, risk arises
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due to the fact that the two kinds of individuals have different investment horizons.
Credit risk is related with the possibility of shrinkage in the value of the banks’ assets
due to incapacity of the borrowers to service their debt. In an attempt to reduce this risk,
banks can become more demanding with the screening of loan applicants; they can pay
special attention to portfolio diversification or they can opt to ask for collateral.
However, all of these measures have associated costs. Should banks screen their
applicants too severely then they would lose money simply due to the fact that riskier
projects are charged higher interest rates. On the other hand, small banks may have
difficulties in diversifying their portfolio because they are either focused on a specific
sector or region. Lastly, collateral may become too costly to monitor and its value may
be hard to measure. Whenever the loan losses exceed the capital reserves of the
institution,  the  bank  enters  into  a  crisis.  To  consider  this  as  a  systemic  crisis,  a  great
portion of the banking system needs to face this same problem. Indirectly, shocks
affecting the performance of bank borrowers will have a tremendous impact on banks’
sustainability. Caprio and Klingebie (1996) and Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) identify
some of these shocks to be related with asset prices reductions, depreciations in the
terms of trade and also cyclical output downturns.
Another important way in which banks can face difficulties is related with the increase
in short-term real interest rates. Given that banks have a fixed return on their assets –
long-term loans typically have fixed rates – an increase in the interest rates granted to
the depositors would cause a decrease on its overall rate of return. This deterioration of
the banks’ balance sheet position could be partly passed on to the customers by
charging more on future loans, however, this poses a problem of nonperforming loans.
Theoretically, the determinants of sharp increases in short-term interest rates can
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indirectly increase the likelihood of a systemic banking crisis. Among these
determinants are a restrictive monetary policy, inflation rate increases, reduction of
interest rate controls resulting from liberalization (Galbis, 1993) or even measures taken
to protect currencies from speculative attacks (Kaminsky and Reinhart, 1999).
A third way in which a bank is exposed to returns mismatch results from the existence
of international business – borrowing in foreign currency to lend in domestic currency.
In this scenario, sharp depreciations of the domestic currency can leave banks in an
extremely uncomfortable position. Once again, financial institutions have the possibility
of passing on the risk to its customers by lending in foreign currency, facing the
consequent possible increase in nonperforming loans. Examples of this type of crises
were the ones in Mexico in 1995, in the Nordic Countries in the early 1990s and in
Turkey in 1994.
A very special characteristic of the banking system is its inexorable dependence of the
confidence the depositors have on the system. According to Diamond and Dybvig
(1993), bank runs may be self-fulfilling which leaves banks in the hands of an overall
strong confidence in the system. To fight down the fact that groundless panic can cause
the whole banking system to struggle, deposit insurance can be introduced. There are
two types of deposit insurance – explicit or implicit. In the former, there is a clear
insurance on behalf of the depositors, purchased by the bank from either the government
or a private institution. Regarding the latter, there is a generalized belief that in case of
need, the government will either prevent the bank to collapse or in case the institution
falls, it will step in to make up for the depositors’ losses. Researchers, however,
disagree on the benefits of having deposit insurance. If, on the one hand, it can calm
down investors avoiding self-fulfilling crises, on the other it can introduce a problem of
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moral hazard. Whenever the premium paid for the insurance is not reflecting the risk of
the portfolio being secured, there is room for a risk-taking action from the bank. Also,
the effects of the deposit insurance increase when we are in the presence of financial
liberalization. The theory, being ambiguous on this field, demands that these
mechanisms are well designed, implemented and monitored, bringing supervision into
play. A strong legal system that makes sure the law is enforced may reduce the
possibilities of bad management arising from a strong liberalization allied to a deposit
insurance facility. As such, rule of law appears to be important when looking at
financial health.
Lastly, capital inflows may have a word on banking crisis. With the globalization, the
banking sector became more exposed to foreign causes of distress. Liquidity shortages
are one example of such fragilities. When we have economies with high interest rates
combined with a period of financial liberalization, large capital inflows may occur,
leading to an expansion in the supply of credit. The moment these conditions change –
foreign interest rates increase or confidence is reduced – the national credit market will
face a problem of lack of liquidity as explained by Calvo, Leidermand, and Reinhart
(1993). The same kind of problem can be caused by a capital outflow driven by a
possible devaluation of a fixed exchange rate currency due to a speculative attack.
b. Financial liberalization
Governments play a decisive role in determining the financial liberalization degree of a
specific country. Governing institutions can impose controls on several financial
variables to either tighten or ease liberalization of the banking sector. Among them are
capital controls, credit controls, interest rate controls, barriers to entry and banking
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sector ownership. In this section, I intend to explain to what extent the manipulation of
these variables is related to a more or less liberalized financial system as well as the
connections that may arise with a banking crisis.
Starting with capital controls, these can be of two different natures: administrative or
market-based. While the former ones deal essentially with limits imposed on capital
transference and authorizations on capital movements, the latter ones translate into taxes
levied on capital inflows, extraordinary reserve requirements for foreign institutions or
even the obligation to invest part of the money in non-interest bearing loans, acting as a
hidden tax. Regarding the duration of these measures, they can appear as a temporary
measure which tends to be used to smooth macroeconomic fluctuations or as long-term
restrictions aiming at increasing capital allocation resulting in output growth and life
standards improvements. Historically, capital restrictions evolved along major global
financial and economic events. Going back to the gold standard period, capital moved
freely across borders with almost no restrictions, John Maynard Keynes was at the time
a fervent supporter of this kind of system. His view, however, changed slightly by the
time the Great Depression broke out in 1929 and so did the view of the majority of the
world leaders. The fear of a major contagion trough external capital flows led to a surge
in  the  imposition  of  capital  controls.  Once  again,  the  new status quo would only be
reversed with the next big financial  change – the end of the Bretton Woods system in
1973. From then onwards, floating exchange rates led to the relaxation of capital
movements restrictions in the richer countries. Money flowing to the emerging market
economies allowed for greater returns on savings of the developed economies as well as
an increase in employment opportunities and living standards in the developing
economies. More recently, the world was shaken by the 2008 financial crisis that
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incentivised  decision  makers  to  think  about  the  not  so  pretty  side  of  globalization.  As
history repeats itself, a reversal in terms of capital restrictions was seen once again with
some countries tending to have greater caution on capital flows allowed. Money stopped
flowing to less developed countries jeopardizing the steady growth they had achieved so
far while investments in less risky projects/financial products led to a reduction in the
rates of return in developed countries. All this swings in capital flows controls leads us
to the question on whether a relaxation of these measures is beneficial to the health of
the financial system. Theoretically, liberalization of this field should allow for a more
efficient capital allocation, as it has been said, and also to a reduction in volatility of the
nations’ national income. Since crises across borders are not totally synchronized,
having investments abroad can reduce the impact of macroeconomic shocks. Other
advantages relate to the incentives created for decision makers to keep up the good work
under penalty of having capital outflowing from its economies. Lastly, the transference
of both technological and managerial knowledge is fostered with capital controls easing.
Regarding interest rate controls, these are often taken as the first sign of financial
deregulation (Demirgüc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998a). Such restrictions can be
imposed to reduce the impact of asymmetric information faced by lenders, to favor a
crucial sector or industry for the economy (Miller, 2013) or even to protect consumers
from arbitrarily set interest rates (Maimbo and Gallegos, 2014). In the presence of
strong market power of the financial system, it can also help limiting the price of credit.
Given that interest rate caps distort the market, it causes banks to ask for more
collateral, to reduce the supply of credit or even to operate at a loss. Other negative
effects are tied to an increase in shadow banking, increase in total cost of loans through
alternative charges such as fees and commissions and a decrease in the product diversity
12
as shown by (Maimbo and Gallegos, 2014). According to Weller (1999), interest rate
ceiling removal should make it easier for commercial banks to attract deposits and also
for them to provide loans. Imposing caps on interest rates charged by banks would mean
that  riskier  projects,  with  consequent  higher  rates  of  return,  would  be  ruled  out  of  the
banks’ balance sheet. If, on the one hand it reduces risk taking behaviors, on the other
hand it certainly reduces profitability. All in all, interest rate controls abolishment
should increase efficiency in allocating capital as it eliminates distortions in financial
intermediaries’ willingness to supply credit to the real side of the economy by reducing
the incentives for adverse selection.
Another dimension of financial liberalization are the barriers to entry that foreign
financial institutions might face when trying to enter new markets. Levine (1996)
stresses out the main advantages of removing such barriers as being related with
increased competitiveness, a broader offer of financial services and eased access to the
most recent technology and banking skills. At the same time, the development of all the
underlying regulatory institutions would be fostered by an increase in market players.
Finally, access to foreign capital would be much more facilitated. Concerning the
negative  impact  of  reducing  controls  on  which  banks  can  operate  in  the  domestic
market, these are mainly related with the dimension of the brand and institutions. Given
that foreign banks are normally big companies with strong reputational background,
governments, customers and domestic competitors may suffer. Governments may
actually lose power when dealing with these banks; customers might face the same old
credit suppliers due to the fact that these banks tend to have their business channeled to
multinational  corporations;  domestic  competitors  will  see  their  costs  increasing  to  be
able to compete with stronger and more mature brands. In their study, Claessens,
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Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizingaa (2001), found that international banks tend to realize
higher profits in developing countries by taking advantage of exemptions on credit
allocation and several other restrictions. On the contrary, in the case of developed
countries, foreign banks have lower margins than domestic banks. The cause might be a
more sophisticated and competitive system allied with information disadvantages. They
also prove that the impacts of allowing foreign banks to operate domestically are felt
immediately and not only after they win market share. Overall, the reduction in margins
and the increased competition might leave domestic banks vulnerable by “reducing their
chartered values” (Claessens, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizingaa, 2001). Should the
regulatory system be fragile, the stability of the financial system can be endangered.
4. Data
To test whether financial liberalization increases the likelihood of a systemic banking
crisis, several datasets are needed: data on banking crises, data on financial
liberalization and data regarding control variables. Concerning the data on systemic
banking crises, it is based on Laeven and Valencia (2012) which provide an extensive
database spanning from the late 1970’s until 2008. It takes the form of a dummy
variable assuming the value 1 if the country was living a systemic banking crisis in that
year or zero otherwise. According to the researchers, banking crises were defined as
events that meet two criteria: “i) significant signs of financial distress in the banking
system (as indicated by bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank
liquidations) and ii) significant banking policy intervention measures in response to
significant losses in the banking system.” (Laeven and Valencia, 2012: 4). Moreover, a
crisis was deemed systemic by the year that both criteria were met simultaneously.
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The dataset on financial liberalization is from Abiad, Detragiache, and Tressel (2008).
Using the same methodology, in which the components are scaled from 0 (not
liberalized) to 3 (fully liberalized) and then summed, this is an updated version of the
dataset created in 2005 that contemplated six dimensions that potentially contributed to
financial liberalization. The new indicator has now a broader scope including the
following seven dimensions: credit controls and reserve requirements, interest rate
controls, entry barriers, state ownership, policies on securities markets, banking
regulations, and restrictions on the capital account. Table 1 shows the descriptive
statistics for the period being analyzed and Table 2 presents the correlation coefficients.
Table 1 - Summary statistics for financial liberalization components and index. Data for
79 countries with time window restricted by data availability for each country.
Variables Number ofObservations Mean
Standard
Deviation Minimum Maximum
Credit Controls 945 1.911 1.005 0 3
Interest Rate Controls 945 2.201 1.173 0 3
Entry Barriers 945 2.005 1.139 0 3
Banking Supervision 945 1.019 0.989 0 3
Privatization 945 1.472 1.237 0 3
Capital Account Controls 945 1.858 1.061 0 3
Security Markets 945 1.608 1.021 0 3
Liberalization Index 945 12.075 5.877 0 21
Control variables to be included in the model were selected based on both data
availability and literature results. I based my choice of this set of variables on previous
papers by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (1998a), Mehrez and Kaufmann (1999) and
Glick and Hutchison (2000). The macroeconomic variables are: real GDP growth rate
lagged by one period, real GDP per capita growth, real interest rate, inflation rate using
the CPI1 and change in the terms of trade. Among the financial variable are: M2 to
1 I transformed inflation rates according to the formula (π/100)/(1+(π/100)) to reduce the impact of
extreme events.
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international reserves ratio and credit to private sector as a percentage of GDP lagged by
two periods. Table 3 shows the expected sign of the coefficients associated with each of
the control variables based on the theoretical explanation given in Section 3.






















Barriers 0.44 0.55 1.00
Banking
Supervision 0.55 0.50 0.52 1.00




0.48 0.61 0.44 0.55 0.51 1.00
Security
Markets 0.53 0.55 0.51 0.65 0.51 0.68 1.00
Liberalization
Index 0.73 0.81 0.73 0.78 0.74 0.79 0.81 1.00
Table 3 - Expected signs of control variables according to the theoretical basis described
in Section 3.
Variables Expected Sign Source
Real GDP Growth (t-1) - WDI
Real GDP per capita growth - WDI
Real Interest Rate + WDI
Inflation + WDI
M2/ Reserves + WDI
Terms of Trade +/- WDI
Credit to Private Sector (t-2) + WDI
5. Model Specification
To model the impact of financial liberalization on the likelihood of a systemic banking
crisis, a panel data probit model was used. Systemic banking crisis were modeled as a
16
binary variable that takes the value of 1 during the years of the systemic banking crisis
and zero otherwise. It was then assumed that for each country, every year, this type of
banking crisis is a function of a series of control variables X(i) and the liberalization
index L according to the following equation:
Y*=α+β0L+β1X1+…+βkXk+ε (1)
To proceed to the coefficient estimation, the log-likelihood function in equation (2) will
be maximized. The LHS is a latent variable used in the determination of the probability
of a systemic crisis. For country i at time t, Y(i,t) will either be 1 or zero should it have
suffered  a  crisis  or  not,  respectively.  Associated  with  each  term  is  the  probability  of
occurrence of a crisis which, in turn, will be given by a combination of n variables (both
the financial liberalization indicators and control variables) represented as X(i,t) and a
vector of unknown coefficients β. F(β’X(i,t)) is the cumulative probability distribution
function and the log-likelihood function of the model takes the form:
Ln L= [Y(i,t) ln{F(β' X(i,t))}+(1-Y(i,t)) ln{1-F(β' X(i,t))} ] (2)
Given that the probability is being modeled using a normal distribution, the
interpretation of the coefficients is different from the linear regression models. In this
case, they do not represent the increase in the probability of a banking crisis given a
unitary increase in the associated explanatory variable. Instead, the imputed change
depends on the initial probability and will amount to βif(xi).
6. Systemic banking crises and financial liberalization: empirical findings
Table  4  shows  the  results  using  the  panel  data  probit  model  described  above.  It  is
important to stress that the possibility of multicollinearity is ruled out by the matrix of
correlations in Table 5 in the appendix that shows the low correlations between control
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variables. This analysis was made for 79 countries2, for a period that spans from 1973
until 2005. Data availability may condition the number of observations per country.
Model  I  is  a  regression  of  the  systemic  banking  crisis  dummy  against  all  control
variables. In this first model, no liberalization measure was included. Only four
variables (real GDP growth, GDP per capita growth, M2/reserves and credit to private
sector) appear to be significant at the 1% level. The signs of the coefficients for the
significant variables are in line with the predictions made in Table 3.  The real  side of
the economy, as shown by the real GDP growth seems to have had a big impact on
shaping the systemic banking crises for the period under analysis. Another interesting
characteristic is that it loses significance if it is lagged by two periods. This indicates
that the impact of swings in output tend to vanish relatively quickly from the banks’
balance sheets. External exposure, as proxied by M2 over reserves increases the
likelihood of a systemic crisis. External shocks become more meaningful in economies
with greater international openness and have a positive impact on the probability of a
crisis.
The second model includes all control variables and the liberalization index. To capture
the effect of liberalization, I used the average of the previous 5 years’ index values as
was done by Mehrez and Kaufmann (2000). In this model, besides the four control
variables that continue to be significant at the 1% level, the liberalization index is also
significant at this level. Moreover, its coefficient is negative, showing some evidence
that liberalization measures taken in the previous five years actually tend to reduce the
likelihood of a systemic banking crisis.
2 See Table 6 in the appendix
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In models III  to IX one component of the liberalization index was included at  a time.
The four control variables (real GDP growth, GDP per capita growth, M2/reserves and
credit to private sector) continue to be statistically significance at 1% with exception of
M2/reserves that is only significant at a 5% when banking supervision and security
market components were used. Looking at the individual components of the
liberalization measure, all of the seven present negative coefficients meaning that, if
anything, they tend to reduce the likelihood of a systemic banking crisis in the 5 years
following the financial liberalization measures take place. Regarding statistical
significance, only banking supervision is significant at 1% level; credit controls, entry
barriers, privatization and security markets are significant at 5% only and interest rate
controls and capital account controls are not statistically significant at all. Wald tests
indicate that all models are jointly significant at the 1% level.
19
Table 4 - Systemic Banking Crisis: Panel Data Probit Model estimation results
I II III IV
Control variables
Real GDP Growth (t-1) -6.3154 *** -5.8852 *** -5.848 *** -6.2749 ***
(1.4662) (1.4896) (1.4786) (1.4726)
Real GDP per capita growth -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 ***
(0.000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Real Interest Rate -0.2013 -0.0530 -0.0888 -0.1830
(0.3179) (0.3203) (0.3146) (0.3227)
Inflation -5.2195 -7.4594 -7.9778 -5.3935
(8.7891) (11.4766) (11.9614) (9.0688)
M2/ Reserves 0.0074 *** 0.0066 ** 0.0069 *** 0.0073 ***
(0.0026) -0.0027 (0.0026) (0.0026)
Terms of Trade -0.0059 -0.0042 -0.0047 -0.0057
(0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0047)
Credit to Private Sector (t-2) 0.9509 *** 1.1745 *** 0.9509 *** 0.9608 ***
(-0.334) (0.3689) (0.3310) (0.3370)
Financial Liberalization
Liberalization Index -0.0450 ***
(0.0168)
Credit Controls -0.1636 **
(0.0713)
Interest Rate Controls -0.0199
(0.0642)
Constant -1.3102 *** -1.0327 *** -1.06602 *** -1.2770 ***
(0.1795) (0.2056) (0.2038) (0.2087)
Wald Chi-Square 44.30 48.51 49.32 44.35
AIC 609.545 603.897 606.260 611.449
Number of observations 945 945 945 945
Number of Countries 79 79 79 79
*** indicates significance at 1% level whereas ** indicates significance at 5% level and * indicates
significance at 10%
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Table 4 (Continued) - Systemic Banking Crisis: Panel Data Probit Model estimation
results
V VI VII VIII IX
Control variables
Real GDP Growth (t-1) -6.14394 *** -5.9433 *** -5.9559 *** -6.1146 *** -5.9107 ***
(1.4824) (1.4515) (1.4990) (1.4833) (1.4829)
Real GDP per capita
growth -6.9E-05 *** 0.0000 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 *** -0.0001 ***
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.000) (0.0000)
Real Interest Rate -0.08322 -0.0118 -0.0638 -0.2121 -0.0890
(0.3206) (0.3120) (0.3233) (0.3200) (0.3197)
Inflation -6.10774 -7.9860 -7.0723 -7.1446 -6.3116
(9.2729) (11.7373) (10.8178) (11.1681) (10.5709)
M2/ Reserves 0.007851 *** 0.0065 ** 0.0076 *** 0.0069 *** 0.0066 **
(0.0026) (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026)
Terms of Trade -0.00481 -0.0044 -0.0051 -0.0055 -0.0045
(0.0047) (0.0045) (0.0046) (0.0046) (0.0046)
Credit to Private Sector
(t-2) 1.095379 *** 1.0662 *** 1.0367 *** 1.0133 *** 1.1066 ***
(0.3647) (0.3318) (0.3474) (0.3462) (0.3505)
Financial
Liberalization
Entry Barriers -0.1750 **
(0.0689)







Security Markets -0.2113 **
(0.0985)
Constant -1.06671 *** -1.1135 *** -1.1491 *** -1.1604 *** -1.1207 ***
(0.2044) (0.1751) (0.1877) (0.2074) (0.1953)
Wald Chi-Square 47.48 56.12 48.11 45.37 47.72
AIC 604.702 597.745 604.701 609.455 606.782
Number of observations 945 945 945 945 945
Number of Countries 79 79 79 79 79




Several changes were imposed to the data to test for robustness. Firstly, I conducted a
sensitivity analysis by using different average periods (4, 3 and 2 years) for the
liberalization index. The results are very similar to the ones obtained with the 5 year
average: significance of variables does not change as well as coefficient signs.
Another change imposed was to ignore the years following a first systemic crisis. This
reduced the number of observations to 884 but the number of groups remained constant.
With the new specification, all models in Table 4 have smaller AIC coefficients as
shown in Table 7 of the appendices. Ignoring the observations after the first systemic
crisis also changed, on average, the significance of two control variables. Whilst the
change in the terms of trade became significant at 10% for Models I, IV, VII and VIII,
the M2/reserves variable became significant at only a superior level of confidence3. All
the models remain jointly significant at the 1% level as per the Wald Chi-square
statistic.
Finally, I used a conditional logit model in light of Arellano and Hahn (2007) who
argue that fixed effects are not well modeled by a probit estimator. I faced a drop in
observations from 945 to 567 but the main results do not get altered.
8. Conclusion
With this study I found that financial liberalization tends to decrease the likelihood of
systemic banking crisis. Also, results showed to be robust to a series of tests. Effects of
liberalization measures tend to have a quick impact since decreasing the average of
3 M2/reserves became significant at a 5% level for models I, III, V, VII and VIII and at 10% for the
remaining models
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liberalization from 5 years to shorter periods did not change the main conclusions. A
reduction in the number of observations also maintained the crucial conclusion that, if
anything, financial liberalization decreases the probability of a systemic banking crisis.
Further studies on this matter might be of interest when data regarding the 2008
financial crisis and its aftermath are available for the world economies. Although this
would result in a shorter sample, considering groups of countries separately (i.e. OECD,
developing countries) could end up showing different impacts of the several
determinants depending on the sample being considered.
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10. Appendices































Rate 0.06 -0.10 -0.10 1.00
Inflation -0.01 -0.16 -0.05 -0.20 1.00
M2/
Reserves 0.09 -0.12 0.25 -0.01 -0.02 1.00
Terms of




-0.03 0.02 0.60 -0.05 -0.07 0.14 0.02 1.00
Table 6 - List of countries considered for the analysis
Albania Canada Ethiopia Ireland Morocco Poland Tunisia
Algeria China Finland Israel Mozambique Romania Uganda
Azerbaijan Colombia France Italy Nepal Russia Ukraine
Bangladesh Costa Rica Georgia Japan Netherlands Senegal United States
Belarus Cote d Ivoire Germany Jordan New Zealand Singapore Uruguay
Belgium Czech Rep Ghana Kenya Nicaragua South Africa Vietnam
Bolivia Denmark Greece Kyrgyz Rep Nigeria Spain Zimbabwe
Brazil Dominican Rep Guatemala Latvia Norway Sri Lanka
Britain Ecuador Hong Kong Lithuania Pakistan Sweden
Bulgaria Egypt Hungary Madagascar Paraguay Switzerland
Burkina-Faso El Salvador India Malaysia Peru Tanzania
Cameroon Estonia Indonesia Mexico Philippines Thailand
26
Table 7 - Estimation results ignoring the crises happening after the first systemic crisis
for each country
I II III IV
Control variables
Real GDP growth (t-1) -6,1453 *** -5,73872 *** -5,7114 *** -5,9802 ***
(1.5323) (1.5506) (1.5330) (1.5449)
Real GDP per capita growth -0,0001 *** -0,0001 *** -0,0001 *** -0,0001 ***
(0.0000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.0000)
Real Interest Rate -0,3864 -0,23693 -0,2489 -0,3244
(0.3538) (0.3545) (0.3454) (0.3565)








M2/ Reserves 0,0062 ** 0,0052 * 0,0054 *** 0,0057 ***
(0.0029) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0030)
Terms of Trade -0,0088 * -0,0072 -0,0075 -0,0082
(0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0048)
Credit to Private Sector (t-2) 1,0586 *** 1,2704 *** 1,0307 *** 1,0994 ***










Constant -1,3485 *** -1,0650 *** -1,0343 *** -1,2446 ***
(0.1897) (0.2145) (0.2133) (0.2167)
Wald Chi-Square 40,88 44,37 47,79 41,24
AIC 543,548 538,755 539,038 544,587
Number of observations 884 884 884 884
Number of Countries 79 79 79 79
*** indicates significance at 1% level whereas ** indicates significance at 5% level and * indicates
significance at 10%
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Table 7 (continued) - Estimation results ignoring the crises happening after the first
systemic crisis for each country
V VI VII VIII IX
Control variables
Real GDP growth (t-1) -6,1132 *** -5,8776 *** -5,8985 *** -5,9931 *** -5,7549 ***
(1.5384) (1.5031) (1.5611) (1.546) (1.5440)
Real GDP per capita -0,0001 *** 0,0000 *** -0,0001 *** -0,0001 *** -0,0001 ***
growth (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Real Interest Rate -0,2667 -0,2071 -0,2637 -0,3926 -0,2591
















M2/ Reserves 0,0063 ** 0,0051 * 0,0063 * 0,0056 * 0,0050 *
(0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.003) (0.0030)
Terms of Trade -0,0078 -0,0072 -0,0083 * -0,0084 * -0,0073
(0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0048)
Credit to Private Sector
(t-2) 1,1835 *** 1,1143 *** 1,1468 *** 1,1048 *** 1,2281 ***
(0.3788) (0.3379) (0.3671) (0.3620) (0.3690)
Financial
Liberalization
Entry Barriers -0,1755 **
(0.0778)







Security Markets -0,2387 **
(0.1066)
Constant -1,0983 *** -1,1555 *** -1,2073 *** -1,2305 *** -1,1349 ***
(0.2135) (0.1822) (0.1975) (0.219) '(0.204)
Wald Chi-Square 43,26 40,88 42,96 41,29 44,43
AIC 540,104 535,978 540,595 544,425 540,267
Number of observations 884 884 884 884 884
Number of Countries 79 79 79 79 79
*** indicates significance at 1% level whereas ** indicates significance at 5% level and * indicates
significance at 10%
